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Abstract 
This paper analyses the volatility of euro money market interest rates and tests for the 
existence of volatility transmission from overnight rates to longer-term rates. The results 
suggest that a significant proportion of the volatility of the EONIA is transmitted to 1-month 
and 3-month interest rates during most days. However, the abnormally high volatility during 
the last two days of the maintenance period does not seem to be transmitted to longer-term 
rates. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Achieving some minimum degree of stability in very short-term interest rates is normally one 
of the goals of the design of the operational framework of monetary policy. Implicitly, it is 
assumed that volatility is not internalised in the short-term money markets, but is instead 
transmitted to the longer-term rates, which are more relevant to investment and consumption 
decisions. In practice, there are basically two types of techniques to stabilise short-term 
interest rates: more or less continuous interventions in the money markets by central banks, 
or averaging reserve requirements. Both systems have advantages and drawbacks. The main 
problem with the first technique is that it tends to discourage market activity in the money 
markets whereas with the second, short-term interest rate volatility tends to rise at the 
end of the maintenance period. The US Federal Reserve is an example of a central bank 
that continuously intervenes in the markets. By contrast, other central banks such as the 
Bundesbank and the Banco de España used the averaging reserve system before EMU. 
Like most central banks, the Eurosystem has also adopted an operational framework 
aimed, among other things, at stabilising the very short-term interest rates in the euro area. 
More specifically, its operational framework includes an averaging reserve requirement 
system while direct interventions in the money markets are kept to a minimum. Against 
this background, and once enough time has elapsed to undertake an empirical analysis, it is 
worth testing whether interest rate volatility is transmitted along the yield curve, paying special 
attention to what occurs at the end of the maintenance period. 
So far there is little empirical evidence documenting the existence of a significant 
transmission of volatility along the yield curve either in the euro area or in other countries. 
Ayuso et al. (1997) estimate the volatility of money market rates for various European 
countries before EMU –their sample covers the period 1988 to 1993– using an EGARCH 
model and introducing an estimate of the overnight rate volatility as an additional exogenous 
variable. They find a significant volatility transmission from overnight to longer-term money 
market rates for France, Spain and the UK. However, Vila (2002), using a similar 
methodology, does not find evidence of transmission of volatility from short-term interest rates 
to longer-term rates in the UK in her database, which covered the period between 1994 
and 2001. After EMU, to the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers that analyse 
these issues for the euro area. Navarro Azorín (2001) estimates a multivariate GARCH model 
for various maturities and finds evidence of some volatility transmission from overnight rates 
to long-term rates and also in the other direction. However, he did not analyse to what extent 
these patterns remain unchanged at the end of the maintenance periods. Cassola and 
Morana (2003) estimate a multivariate unobserved components model that allows for both 
long-memory and stationary cyclical dynamics, and they find that two common long-memory 
factors drive the long-run evolution of money market interest rate volatilities. They interpret 
the first factor as measuring the intensity of the shock to the short-term interest rates and the 
second factor as measuring the intensity of its transmission along the term structure. 
The reported evidence suggests that liquidity effects were confined to the end of reserve 
maintenance periods and not transmitted along the money market yield curve. However, their 
definition of volatility transmission is different from that analysed in previous papers. 
They define transmission as shocks that simultaneously affect both short and long-term rates, 
and there is no causality relationship. This contrasts with previous papers, in which volatility 
transmission means that long-term rate volatility is caused by short-term rate volatility. 
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Against this background, the goals of this paper are to model the volatility of euro 
money market interest rates and to test for the existence of volatility transmission 
from overnight rates to longer-term rates. To do so we use the methodology followed by 
Ayuso et al. (1997). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem and the available information on euro money 
market interest rates. Section 3 outlines the methodology used to estimate the volatility of 
interest rates and their transmission. Section 4 presents the results for the mean equation. 
Section 5 discusses the main properties of the volatility of overnight rates. Section 6 explores 
the existence of volatility transmission along the yield curve. Sections 7 and 8 analyse the 
robustness of results to data used to proxy overnight rates and to the specification of 
the mean model, respectively, and, finally, the last section draws the main conclusions. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0541 
2 The monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem and the information on euro 
money market interest rates 
2.1  The operational framework of the Eurosystem 
The operational framework of the Eurosystem includes three main instruments: reserve 
requirements, open market operations and standing facilities. The minimum reserve system 
pursues the stabilisation of money market interest rates and the creation (or enlargement) of a 
structural liquidity shortage in the banking system. Reserve holdings with the Eurosystem are 
remunerated and compliance is determined on the basis of the counterparties’ average daily 
reserve holdings over the maintenance period, which, till February 2004, started on the 24th of 
each month and ended on the 23rd of the following month. Since then, the maintenance 
period has begun on the settlement day of the first main refinancing operation (MRO) 
following the meeting of the Governing Council at which the monthly assessment of 
the monetary policy stance is pre-scheduled, and has ended on the day preceding the 
corresponding settlement day in the following month. By averaging daily reserve holdings 
during the maintenance period, the system provides a buffer against liquidity shocks in that 
counterparties might use their reserves to absorb any shock and, therefore, it is not normally 
transmitted to interest rates. This property, however, vanishes after the last MRO as the end 
of the maintenance period approaches. 
As regards open market operations, the Eurosystem has four available types of 
transactions, with MROs playing a pivotal role. These operations are regular liquidity-providing 
reserve transactions with a weekly frequency and their maturity was two weeks till 
February 2004 and a week thereafter. These operations are normally executed on Tuesdays 
and settled on Wednesdays. Since June 2000, they have been implemented through 
variable-rate tenders with a pre-announced minimum bid rate. A fixed-rate tender was 
previously used. The minimum bid rate (and the fixed interest in the fixed-rate tenders) plays 
an important role in signalling the monetary policy stance. The other operations include the 
longer-term refinancing operations, fine-tuning operations and the structural operations.1 
Fine-tuning operations consist of interventions in the market to absorb or provide liquidity, but 
they had hardly been used during the sample period analysed in this paper. 
The two aforementioned changes decided by the Governing Council in 2003 that 
were effective as of March 2004 –the change in the timing of the start of the reserve 
maintenance period and the shortening of the maturity of the MROs to one week– are aimed 
at preventing changing interest rate expectations during a maintenance period from 
affecting very short-term money market conditions. In particular, the change in the timing of 
reserve maintenance periods ensures the lack of expectations of movements in key ECB 
rates during the maintenance period, whereas the reduction of the maturity of the MROs 
eliminates the spillover of interest rate expectations from one reserve period to the next. 
Before 2003 the Governing Council had already taken another measure aimed at reducing the 
effects of interest rate expectations on short-term money market rates and on the bidding 
behaviour of counterparties. More specifically, it was decided that after November 2001 the 
assessment of the monetary policy stance would only be undertaken in the first meeting 
of the month –i.e. with a monthly frequency. Up until then that assessment was undertaken 
in the two monthly meetings. 
                                                                          
1. See ECB (2004) for more information on the operational framework of the Eurosystem. 
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Finally, standing facilities aim to provide and absorb overnight liquidity, signal the 
general stance of monetary policy, and bound overnight interest rates. More specifically, there 
are two types of standing facilities: the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility. 
Counterparties may use the first to obtain overnight liquidity from national central banks 
against eligible assets at a pre-specified interest rate, which provides a ceiling for the 
overnight market interest rates. Since April 1999 the interest rate of this instrument has 
always been 100 basis points above the minimum bid rate (or the fixed rate) of the MROs. 
The deposit facility allows counterparties to make overnight deposits with national central 
banks at a pre-specified interest rate, which provides a floor for overnight market interest 
rates. Since April 1999 this interest rate has always been 100 basis points below the 
minimum bid rate (or the fixed rate) of the MROs. 
2.2 The available information on deposit interbank interest rates 
The EONIA is an index, computed by the ECB, representative of the euro overnight deposit 
interbank interest rates. It is computed with a daily frequency as a weighted average of all 
overnight unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market, initiated within the euro 
area by the reporting panel banks. For longer-term money market interest rates, the European 
Banking Federation computes, also with a daily frequency, the EURIBOR indexes for 
maturities ranging from one week to twelve months. Unlike the EONIA, these indexes are 
computed as an average of the offered rates of the contributing banks around 10:45 am 
(CET), after eliminating the highest and lowest 15% of all quotes collected. The panel of 
reporting banks is the same as for the EONIA. Finally, some agencies, such as REUTERS, 
publish on-line indicative bid and ask quotes for various maturities from overnight to a 
maturity of 12 months. 
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3 Modelling the euro money market interest rates and their volatility 
In this paper we focus on the following money market interest rates: overnight –proxied by 
the EONIA–, 1-month, 3-month, and 12-month EURIBOR. We also consider the minimum bid 
rate of the MROs (the fixed rate before June 2000), giving its signalling role. We will refer 
to this as the official rate. The period we cover goes from the start of Monetary Union 
(2nd January 1999) to 6th November 2003, i.e. 1241 trading days. 
Chart 1 depicts all the interest rate series we use. The EONIA rate is on average very 
close to the official rate. However, it shows some spikes, normally around the end of the 
maintenance periods. Its volatility is much higher than that of the other series considered. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests suggest the existence of a unit root in all our 
series of interest rates, i.e. they are all I(1) processes (see Table 1). The Johansen 
cointegration test is carried out for the five interest rates series. The null hypothesis that 
the rank of the cointegrating space is no more than 4 cannot be rejected at standard levels 
(see Table 2), thus revealing the existence of four cointegrating relationships. We also tested 
for the existence of a unit cointegration between the official and money market rates. The null 
was not rejected at standard significant levels. 
We follow a two-step procedure to model interest rates. In the first step we estimate 
an equation for the mean and, in the second step, we estimate an equation for the variance. 
This procedure guarantees asymptotically consistent estimates of parameters. 
Taking into account the previous evidence, the mean equation is modelled as 
a VECM in first differences with four ECMs made up of the four cointegrating relationships. 
Given the results of the test, we impose a unit cointegration. In other words, the cointegrating 
equations are the four spreads between the money market and the official rates. We augment 
the model, when appropriate, to include seasonal dummies. Thus, the model we estimate 
is the following: 
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where rj,t is the interest rate j at period t (j=1: EONIA, j=2: 1-month EURIBOR, j=3: 3-month 
EURIBOR and j=4: 12-month EURIBOR), ot is the official interest rate at period t (minimum bid 
rate in variable rate tenders and fixed rate in fixed-rate tenders), Zi are a set of exogenous 
dummy variables and  εj,t is the innovation. 
We model the conditional variance of the interest rates as an EGARCH process. 
This specification, originally proposed by Nelson (1991), allows us to deal with non-linearities 
and asymmetric responses of conditional variances to negative and positive shocks, 
which seem to be relevant in explaining the behaviour of short-term interest rates. Another 
advantage of these models as compared with GARCH models is that they allow exogenous 
variables to be included in an unrestricted way. Again, when appropriate, we augment the 
model to include seasonal dummies. 
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In our specification of the conditional volatility we restrict the extent of possible 
spillovers to those arising from the EONIA to the other rates. In other words, we follow 
a univariate specification for the conditional variance and include the (log of the) estimated 
volatility of the EONIA in the other volatility equations. This procedure, which coincides with 
the approach followed by Ayuso et al. (1997), is supported by the anchor role played 
by overnight rates for the term structure of interest rates, in the sense that other rates 
are formed taking into account overnight rates. Causality-in-variance tests proposed by 
Cheung and Ng (1996) provide empirical support for the assumption of lack of causality in 
variance from 1-month, 3-month and 12-month interest rates to the EONIA (see Table 3). 
We estimate the conditional volatility by maximum likelihood using the 
residuals of the mean model and compute Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors. 
The EGARCH(p,q) model we estimate is the following: 
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where σj,t2 is the variance of the interest rate j (j=1: EONIA, j=2: 1-month EURIBOR, j=3: 
3-month EURIBOR, and j=4: 12-month EURIBOR) at period t conditional to information up to 
period t-1, εj,t is the unexpected component of the interest rate j, and Zi are exogenous 
variables including dummy variables and, for interest rates other than the EONIA, the 
(log of the) estimated conditional variance of the EONIA. 
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4 The mean equation 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of the mean equation. The number of lags is set 
following the Akaike information criteria. Ljung-Box-Portmanteu tests on residual 
autocorrelation suggest that the number of lags considered is enough to remove any 
correlation in the residuals. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-consistent [White (1980)]. 
Some of the results of Table 4 are worth commenting. The rate of convergence 
of EONIA to official rates is very high (34%), meaning that the EONIA tends to revert quickly 
towards the level of official rates whenever it deviates from it. The (lagged) official rate is 
significant at 5% for all the money market rates except the EONIA. The positive value of 
the parameter means that movements of official rates were not completely anticipated by the 
market. However, the low value of the coefficients means that, on average, more than 80% of 
the movement was anticipated by the market.2 By contrast, in the case of the EONIA, the 
coefficient is not significant. This result reflects that part of the reaction to the official rate 
movement is captured contemporaneously since a proportion of the transactions used to 
compute this rate occurs after the announcement. 
In the EONIA model some seasonal dummy variables turn out to be significant. This 
is the case of the maintenance period dummies. In particular, the dummy variable that 
takes value 1 the last day of the maintenance period is negative and significant, suggesting 
that the EONIA has tended to fall, on average, 6 basis points on the last day of the 
maintenance period. The dummy variable that takes value 1 the first day of the maintenance 
period is positive and significant, meaning that, on average, the EONIA has raised 10 basis 
points on these days. This behaviour suggests that, on average, there has been an excess 
liquidity in the banking system at the end of the maintenance period. The end-month, 
end-semester and end-year dummy variables are all positive and significant at 5%, meaning 
that the EONIA tends to rise at the end of each month, semester and year. This movement 
is, on average, 6 basis points at end-month, 15 basis points more at end-semester and 
an additional rise of 26 basis points at end-year. This behaviour is thought to be mainly 
attributable to the reluctance of institutions to lend funds during these dates due to window 
dressing. The dummy variables for the beginning of the month, semester and year are all 
significant –only at 10% in the case of the beginning of the month– and negative, suggesting 
that these movements are reversed the following day. Some of these effects in the mean level 
of the overnight rate have also been observed in other papers analysing the euro money 
market [Gaspar et al. (2001)] and other markets [Prati et al. (2001)]. 
Over the last quarter of 1999, 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR rates were 
significantly affected by fears over the year-2000 effects. This was reflected in a jump in rates 
for operations starting in 1999 and ending in 2000. To capture these effects we introduce a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 the day the rate jumped (29-November-99 and 29-Sep-99 
for the 1-month and 3-month rates, respectively) and value -1 the date the rate reversed 
(29-Dec-1999). The coefficients of these variables appear to be positive and statistically 
significant in both equations (0.40 and 0.29 in the 1-month and 3-month equations, 
respectively). 
                                                                          
2. The fact that the lag is significant is not surprising if we take into account that the EURIBOR rates are computed 
before the announcement of the official rates 
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The mean models in Table 4 are only able to explain a small proportion of interest 
rate variability, as shown by the relatively low adjusted R2. This is a common result in 
the literature which, as such, explains why variance models tend to be quite robust to 
alternative mean specifications.3
 
                                                                          
3. As a matter of fact, similar results for the variance equations are found when the interest rates are modelled as an 
unrestricted VAR –i.e. without ECMs. 
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5 The volatility of the EONIA 
The analysis of residuals suggests the existence of heroskedasticity non-linearities in the 
conditional variance of the EONIA,4 validating the decision to use an EGARCH model. Table 5 
reports the main results of the estimation of the conditional variance of the EONIA. Our 
preferred model is an EGARCH(3,3) process, which seems sufficient to eliminate any residual 
heteroskedastic effects. In fact, the Ljung-Box-Portmanteu test for autocorrelation of 
standardised squared residuals shows no sign of residual autocorrelation. Similarly, sign tests 
and the non-linearity test proposed by Engle and Ng (1993) do not show any sign of 
misspecification. 
The coefficient of the first lagged standardised shock is positive and statistically 
significant at 10%, providing some evidence that positive shocks tend to have a higher impact 
on volatility than negative shocks of the same absolute size. 
Some seasonal dummy variables appear to be significant. In particular, it is found 
that volatility of the EONIA tends to be lower on Mondays and, especially, on Thursdays than 
on any other day of the week. It is also found that volatility is higher during the last 5 days of 
the maintenance period and, during these days, it tends to increase as the end of the 
maintenance period approaches, and is especially high for the last two days. This pattern 
mainly captures the fact that, during the sample period, liquidity shocks were not 
normally absorbed by the Eurosystem after the last MRO. However, a model that includes a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 after the last MRO performs worse than that presented in 
Table 5, in which a dummy that takes value 1 the last 5 days is used instead. This evidence 
suggests that other factors apart from the fact that there are no more MROs might 
have played a role in explaining the higher volatility of the EONIA at the end of the 
maintenance period. Similarly, volatility also tends to be higher around the end of 
the semester. The volatility is also higher than average the day of the meeting of the 
Governing Council in which the monetary policy stance is assessed. By contrast, on the first 
day of January and July EONIA volatility falls. This type of seasonality has also been found 
in other papers. For instance, Gaspar et al. (2001) report an increase in volatility of EONIA 
around the end of the maintenance period, at the end of the month, and at end-year. 
Cassola and Morana (2003) find evidence of higher volatility at end-month and at the 
end of the maintenance period. Similarly, Prati et al. (2001) document some seasonality 
in the volatility of overnight rates in a number of countries. Pérez and Rodríguez (2001) and 
Bartolini et al. (2002), among others, present theoretical models of overnight interest rates 
with the existence of reserve requirements that reproduce the upward path of volatility during 
the last days of the maintenance periods. 
A closer look at the behaviour of the EONIA shows that a significant proportion of 
the average volatility is explained by the movements of the EONIA around the end of the 
maintenance period (see Chart 2). In particular, the average volatility of the last 5 days 
of the maintenance period is almost 3.5 times as high as the volatility of the other days. 
 
                                                                          
4. To check this we have run non-linearity tests proposed by Engle and Ng (1993). 
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6 Volatility transmission 
The average estimated conditional volatility of the interest rate at the other maturities 
considered in this paper is much lower than that of the EONIA, even if we eliminate 
observations around the end of maintenance periods.5 Chart 3 shows the term structure of 
average conditional volatilities, which proxies the unconditional volatility, in two sub-periods: 
4/1/1999 to 7/11/2001 and 8/11/2001 to 6/11/2003. During the first period the Governing 
Council assessed the monetary policy stance twice a month, whereas in the second period 
the assessment only took place in the first meeting of the month –i.e. with a monthly 
frequency. Two main results emerge from Chart 3. First, the time structure of volatilities 
appears U-shaped in both sub-periods, a pattern similar to that found by Ayuso et al. (1997) 
for a number of countries. Second, the inconditional volatility of short-term interbank rates fell 
in the second sub-period, especially in the case of the EONIA rate, a result that might 
be connected with the change in the number of Governing Council meetings in which the 
monetary policy stance is assessed. 
 Table 6 reports the main results of the estimation of the conditional volatility 
for 1-month, 3-month and 12-month maturities. In all cases our preferred model is 
an EGARCH(1,3) process. The diagnosis tests we use do not show any sign of 
misspecification. To test for volatility transmission we include interactions of the (log of the) 
conditional variance of the EONIA with various dummies. In particular, Table 6 reports 
the results of the interaction of the (log of) the volatility of the EONIA with three different 
dummies which take value 1, respectively, all days before the last MRO, the days after this 
operation except the last two, and the last two days of the maintenance period. 
This procedure, which is similar to that followed by Ayuso et al. (1997), allows us to test 
whether the volatility transmission in these three sub-periods is the same or not. 
The distinction between the volatility on normal days and volatility around the end of the 
maintenance period seems relevant for at least two factors. First, as we have shown, 
the volatility of the EONIA tends to be much higher around the end of the maintenance 
periods, especially the last two days. In this regard, it would be more worrying to 
observe volatility transmissions at the end of the maintenance periods. Second, the source of 
volatility is different. At the end of the maintenance periods liquidity shocks will normally 
drive volatility of the EONIA, whereas during the other days interest rate expectations 
will probably be more important as a source of volatility. Again, when appropriate, we extend 
the model to include seasonal dummies. 
 In the 1-month EURIBOR volatility equation, we find that the parameter of the 
volatility of the EONIA during normal days is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
the existence of volatility transmission during these days. The value of the coefficient (0.16) 
indicates that 16% of the (log of the) EONIA volatility is transmitted to the 1-month EURIBOR 
during these days. The coefficient of the volatility of the EONIA on the last two days of the 
maintenance period turns out to be non-significantly different from zero at standard levels, 
suggesting that during the last two days there is no spillover of volatility from the EONIA to 
the 1-month EURIBOR. Finally, there is also evidence of transmission of volatility the days 
after the last MRO excluding the last two. The size of this effect is even higher than that of the 
                                                                          
5. The different level of estimated volatility between EONIA and EURIBOR rates might partly reflect the different 
procedure used to compute these rates. EURIBOR rates eliminate the highest and lowest 15% of all quotes before 
averaging them. By contrast, all trades are considered when computing the EONIA. 
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days before the last MRO, although the Wald test suggests that these coefficients are not 
statistically different. An analysis by subsamples shows, however, that this latter result is 
not robust to the period chosen. In particular, in the first half of the sample the coefficient 
is not statistically different from zero. Accordingly, this result should be taken with caution. 
 We have also investigated to what extent these results may have been driven by the 
seven underbidding episodes in our sample. In these episodes expectations of an imminent 
rate cut in the key ECB interest rates led counterparties to submit bids that on aggregate fell 
short of the expected amount needed to ensure that the reserve requirements were met. 
To investigate this issue, we interact the variables capturing the volatility spillover with a 
dummy that takes value 1 for days between the underbidding episode and the end of 
the maintenance period. The results suggest that, with the exception of the last two days 
of the maintenance period, the transmission of volatility was unchanged by the existence of 
underbidding. Nonetheless, it is found that, during underbidding episodes, 68% of the 
(log of the) EONIA volatility on the last two days was transmitted to that of the 1-month 
EURIBOR. This effect is also reported in Cassola and Morana (2003). 
 Some seasonal dummies appear to be significant in the 1-month EURIBOR volatility 
equation. More specifically, it is found that volatility tends to be higher on Wednesdays and, in 
contrast with the EONIA, it tends to be lower on the very last day of the maintenance period.  
It is found that volatility tends to be lower on the very last day of the month. Finally, it is also 
found that volatility tends to be higher the day after the meeting of the Governing Council in 
which the monetary policy stance is assessed, reflecting the impact of news of the press 
conference. Note that this effect appears the day after rather than the same day because 
EURIBOR rates are computed before the press conference is held. 
 As regards the volatility spillover from the EONIA to the 3-month EURIBOR, similar 
results are found. The coefficients that capture these effects are also similar in size, although 
slightly smaller. As regards the seasonal dummies, there is also evidence of higher volatility 
after the Governing Council meeting in which the monetary policy stance is assessed, and 
lower volatility on the very last day of the maintenance period. However, in contrast with 
the 1-month EURIBOR, none of the weekday dummies appear to be significant at standard 
levels. 
 Finally, no significant volatility spillovers from the EONIA to the 12-month EURIBOR 
are observed either before or after the last MRO. The seasonal dummies suggest that the 
volatility of the 12-month rate tends to be lower on Mondays and Tuesdays. Also, like 
the 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR, the volatility of the 12-month EURIBOR tends to be 
lower on the very last day of the maintenance period and higher the day after the meeting of 
the Governing Council in which the monetary policy stance is assessed. But, in contrast 
with the 1-month EURIBOR, the volatility rises on the very last day of the month. 
 All in all these results suggest that the volatility of the EONIA is partly transmitted to 
the 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR for days before the last MRO of the maintenance period. 
On the last two days of the maintenance period, in which the EONIA volatility is normally 
much higher, there is no spillover effect. On days after the last MRO excluding the last two 
there is some evidence of volatility spillover from the EONIA to the short-term money market 
rates. However, this result should be taken with caution since it is not robust to the period 
chosen and it is estimated with very few observations. Finally, the volatility of the EONIA is not 
transmitted to the 12-month EURIBOR. The fact that the volatility of the EONIA is only 
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transmitted for short maturities of the money market and before the end of the maintenance 
period could mean that the volatility transmission we observe is related to uncertainty over 
short-term monetary policy decisions. This type of uncertainty will normally have a higher 
impact on the EONIA before the end of the maintenance period and will be more relevant for 
short-term maturities. 
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7 Robustness to non-synchronous data 
One potential problem with the previous analysis is the lack of synchrony between the EONIA 
and the other money market rates. More specifically, the EONIA reflects the average 
overnight tes during the day, whereas the EURIBOR rates reflect the money market rates 
at 10:45 am. In this regard, news appearing during the day after 10:45 am will be reflected in 
the EONIA the same day and on the following day in the EURIBOR rates. This would tend to 
bias results in favour of volatility transmission from the overnight rate to long-term rates. 
To check the robustness of our results to this non-synchronicity problem, in this Section we 
replicate the previous exercises using the average of the bid and ask quotes for the overnight 
rate observed on the REUTERS screens at the same time as the EURIBOR rates are 
computed (10:45 am). We will refer to this series as the overnight rate. Unfortunately, we only 
have data for the period 4th December 2000 to 6th November 2003, i.e. 740 trading days.6
 The average difference between the EONIA and the overnight rate is only 1.6 basis 
points, probably capturing the average size of the bid-ask spread.7 The average absolute 
difference between both rates is also very low (2.8 basis points), suggesting that their 
information content is very similar. However, there are a few days in which both rates depart 
significantly from each other. Interestingly, the volatility of the EONIA, measured as the 
standard deviations of daily changes, is somewhat higher than that of the overnight rate. 
 Table 7 shows the results of our preferred model for the conditional volatility of the 
overnight interest rate, which is an EGARCH(2,3) process. Standard tests do not show any 
sign of misspecification. In contrast to the EONIA, there is no evidence of asymmetric effects. 
Seasonal dummies show some differences as compared to results for the EONIA. It should 
be noted that differences between both might not only reflect the fact that series are 
computed at different times but also that the sample period is not the same. The only 
weekday dummy that appears significantly different from zero is the one that takes value 1 on 
Fridays and shows a negative sign, meaning that on these days overnight rate volatility is 
lower than on other weekdays. Regarding the effect related to the Governing Council meeting 
in which the monetary policy stance is assessed, it appears the day after rather than the 
same day as the meeting as with the EONIA, given that the overnight rate we use is taken 
before the press conference. During the last five days of the maintenance period the volatility 
of the overnight rate tends to increase. Like with the EONIA, the effect between four and two 
days before the end of the maintenance period appears even before the last MRO, although, 
in contrast with the evidence for the EONIA, the size is higher if this operation has taken 
place. Finally, the first day of the maintenance period also turns out to display a higher 
volatility than the average. 
 Table 8 reports the main results of the estimation of the conditional volatility 
for 1-month, 3-month and 12-month maturities. In this case our preferred specification is 
an EGARCH(2,3) for the 1-month and 3-month EURIBOR and an EGARCH(1,3) for 
the 12-month EURIBOR. The coefficients of variables that capture the spillover effects 
along the money market yield curve are similar to those reported in the analysis of the 
previous section. Given that in this case the volatility of the overnight rate on the first day 
of the maintenance period appears significantly higher than the other days, we also test for 
                                                                          
6. We are very grateful to Nuno Cassola, from the ECB,  for providing us these data. 
7. Recall that the EONIA rate is an average of offered rates. 
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the existence of volatility transmission during that day. The evidence suggests that this 
volatility is not transmitted to longer-term rates. Finally, the impact of underbidding and 
results for the seasonal variables are also very similar to the ones reported in the previous 
section. 
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8 Robustness to possible structural change in the mean model 
Arguably, the change in the frequency of meetings in which the monetary policy stance 
is assessed by the Governing Council could have affected the model of the mean. To check 
the robustness of our results to the possible structural change in the mean model, in 
this Section we split the sample into two sub-periods (4/1/1999 to 7/11/2001 and 8/11/2001 
to 6/11/2003), estimate the mean model for each of these sub-periods, and use the 
residuals to re-estimate the conditional volatilities. During the first of these periods 
the Governing Council assessed the monetary policy stance twice a month, whereas in the 
second period the assessment was carried out with a monthly frequency. 
 Table 9 shows the results of the estimation of the conditional variance of the EONIA. 
The specification and point estimates are similar to those reported previously, in which the 
mean model was estimated without splitting the sample (Table 5). More specifically, our 
preferred model continues to be an EGARCH(3,3), which according to diagnosis tests we 
use, seems sufficient to eliminate any residual heteroskedastic effects. However, in contrast 
with the evidence presented in Table 5, the dummy variable MONDAY does not appear 
significant. On the other hand, the point estimate of the coefficient of the end-of-period 
dummy MP turns out to be smaller as compared to that reported in Table 5. 
 The results of the estimation of the conditional volatility for 1-month, 3-month, 
and 12-month maturities are presented in Table 10. In all cases, as in the case when the 
mean model is estimated without splitting the sample (Table 6), our preferred model 
is an EGARCH(1,3) process, which, according to the diagnosis tests we use, does 
not show any sign of misspecification. The point estimates of parameters are also very 
similar. As regards volatility transmission, qualitative results are unchanged. In particular, 
the evidence suggests that the volatility of the EONIA is transmitted for all days except the 
last two of the maintenance period to the 1-month and 3-month maturities but it is not 
transmitted to the 12-month maturity. However, the size of the parameters that capture 
volatility transmission is slightly lower, suggesting a slightly lower transmission. Thus, our 
results seem robust to the specification of the mean model. 
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9 Conclusions  
In this paper we have estimated the conditional volatility of the euro money market rates and 
have investigated to what extent the volatility of the EONIA is transmitted to longer-term rates, 
which are more relevant for investment and consumption decisions. We estimate the 
conditional volatilities using an EGARCH model which allows for volatility spillovers from 
the EONIA to longer-term rates. 
It is found that a significant proportion of the average volatility of the EONIA is 
attributed to the behaviour of this rate around the end of the maintenance period. 
In particular, the last 5 days of the maintenance period and, especially the last two, appear to 
have, on average, a much higher volatility. 
As regards the volatility spillovers, the evidence reported in this paper suggests that 
a significant proportion of the volatility of the EONIA is transmitted to 1-month and 3-month 
interest rates. This result coincides with the evidence documented in Ayuso et al. (1997) for 
France, for Spain before EMU and for the UK. By contrast, the abnormal high volatility during 
the last two days of the maintenance period does not seem to be transmitted to longer-term 
rates. This latter result contrasts with the evidence reported in Ayuso et al. (1997) for Spain 
and France before EMU, where it is found that volatility transmission tended to be even higher 
at the end of maintenance periods. 
Our results suggest that the operational framework of the Eurosystem has worked 
successfully in that the volatility of the overnight rate generated at the end of the maintenance 
periods was not generally transmitted to longer-term rates. In this regard, the choice of not 
using fine-tuning operations at the end of these periods has proved a good decision. On the 
other hand, the fact that short-term interest rate volatility is transmitted to longer-term rates 
during normal days means that the Eurosystem should worry about this volatility. So far it has 
been, however, low by international standards. After November 2001 it was further reduced, 
a move that might be connected with the change in the number of Governing Council 
meetings in which  the monetary policy stance is assessed, in that it contributed to reducing 
interest rate movement expectations during a maintenance period from affecting very 
short-term interest rates. It is worth noting in this regard that the recently introduced changes 
in the monetary policy framework –change in the timing of the start of the reserve 
maintenance period and the shortening of the maturity of the MROs to one week–, which 
could not be analysed in this paper due to the lack of sufficient data, mean a new step ahead 
in the process of preventing changes in interest rate expectations from affecting very 
short-term money market conditions. 
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 ADF UNIT ROOT TEST
LEVEL FIRST DIFFERENCE
OFFICIAL RATE -0.230 -17.559
EONIA -1.574 -22.821
1-MONTH EURIBOR 0.030 -16.943
3-MONTH EURIBOR 0.020 -14.328
12-MONTH EURIBOR -0.315 -16.098
3 lags and intercept. 5% (1%) critical value is -2.86 (-3.44).
TABLE 1
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JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TEST
Null hypothesis: 
cointegration rank r
Eigenvalue Likelihood ratio 5% critical value 1% critical value
r=0 0.123 293.442 76.070 84.450
r<=1 0.047 131.124 53.120 60.160
r<=2 0.037 71.703 34.910 41.070
r<=3 0.017 25.681 19.960 24.600
r<=4 0.004 4.538 9.240 12.970
3 lags and intercept.  L.R. test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level.
TABLE 2
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CAUSALITY-IN-VARIANCE TESTS
Number of lags
1-month EURIBOR causes 
EONIA
3-month EURIBOR causes 
EONIA
12-month EURIBOR causes 
EONIA
k=5 1.936 3.932 3.564
k=10 10.895 8.725 4.339
This table reports the values of the S statistic proposed by Cheung and Ng (1996) to detect causality in variance. S=T Σ1k ruv(i)2
where T is the number of observations and r(i)2 is the squared sample cross-correlation at lag i between u and v. u and v are the
squares of standardised innovations of the two interest rates for which causality is tested. These standardised innovations are
computed estimating univariate mean and variance models. Under the null of no causality S has a chi-square distribution with k
degrees of freedom. The 5% critical values are 11.1 for k=5 and 18.3 for k=10.
TABLE 3
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THE MEAN EQUATION
coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error
Intercept 0.008 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(r1-o)t-1 -0.337 0.028 -0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.008
(r2-o)t-1 0.194 0.056 -0.030 0.012 -0.024 0.010 -0.010 0.015
(r3-o)t-1 -0.008 0.048 0.017 0.010 0.000 0.008 -0.008 0.013
(r4-o)t-1 -0.029 0.019 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.003 0.012 0.005
Δr1,t-1 0.027 0.031 0.014 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.009
∆r1,t-2 -0.011 0.029 -0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008
∆r1,t-3 0.010 0.028 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.008
∆r2,t-1 0.042 0.169 0.062 0.035 0.024 0.030 -0.031 0.047
∆r2,t-2 0.246 0.169 -0.025 0.035 -0.016 0.030 -0.088 0.047
∆r2,t-3 -0.038 0.161 -0.085 0.033 -0.080 0.028 -0.146 0.045
∆r3,t-1 0.332 0.233 0.054 0.048 0.022 0.041 0.008 0.065
∆r3,t-2 -0.057 0.232 0.039 0.048 0.082 0.041 0.146 0.064
∆r3,t-3 0.067 0.229 0.170 0.047 0.134 0.040 0.198 0.064
∆r4,t-1 -0.016 0.135 0.037 0.028 0.088 0.024 0.080 0.037
∆r4,t-2 -0.111 0.135 -0.003 0.028 0.018 0.024 -0.008 0.037
∆r4,t-3 0.150 0.134 -0.053 0.028 -0.042 0.023 -0.063 0.037
∆ot-1 0.055 0.085 0.181 0.017 0.139 0.015 0.113 0.023
∆ot-2 -0.098 0.087 -0.034 0.018 -0.032 0.015 -0.030 0.024
∆ot-3 0.145 0.088 -0.011 0.018 -0.007 0.015 -0.005 0.024
MPt -0.057 0.017 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.005
MPt-1 0.099 0.017 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.005
MONTHt 0.064 0.018 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.005
MONTHt-1 -0.032 0.018 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.005
HALFYEARt 0.151 0.058 0.005 0.012 0.007 0.010 0.017 0.016
HALFYEARt-1 -0.119 0.058 0.000 0.012 -0.002 0.010 -0.023 0.016
YEARt 0.264 0.084 0.000 0.017 -0.008 0.015 -0.017 0.023
YEARt-1 -0.166 0.084 -0.004 0.017 -0.002 0.015 -0.007 0.023
Y20001Mt 0.040 0.101 0.402 0.021 -0.096 0.018 -0.007 0.028
Y20003Mt 0.020 0.100 -0.029 0.021 0.285 0.018 0.017 0.028
Adjusted R2 
Q10
0.32
6.22
12-MONTH EURIBOR
0.07
4.90
3-MONTH EURIBOREONIA
0.29
1.58
1-MONTH EURIBOR
0.38
15.90
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errrors (White (1980)). Q10 stands for the Ljung-Box-Portmanteau statistic for 10th order
serial correlation. MP, MONTH, HALFYEAR, YEAR, are dummy variables that take value 1, respectively, on the last day of: the
maintenance period, the month, June and December, and the year. Y20001M takes value 1on 29-11-99 and value -1 on 29-12-
99. Y20003M takes value 1 on 29-9-99 and value -1 on 29-12-99.
TABLE 4
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THE CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF THE EONIA
coefficient standard error
ω0 -2.682 0.186
ω1 0.993 0.082
μ1 0.132 0.079
ω2 -0.539 0.094
μ2 -0.111 0.086
ω3 0.549 0.091
μ3 0.281 0.066
λ1 1.280 0.055
λ2 -1.020 0.078
λ3 0.431 0.047
MONDAYt -0.486 0.172
THURSDAYt -0.830 0.216
MPt+4+MPt+3+MPt+2 1.079 0.116
MPt+1 1.909 0.189
MPt 2.666 0.244
HALFYEARt 2.466 0.439
HALFYEARt-1 -2.071 0.355
MEETINGt 0.756 0.208
Q2(10) 3.339
SIGN 1.583
POS -1.342
NEG -0.169
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. MONDAY, THURSDAY, MP AND HALFYEAR are stational dummy variables
that take value 1, respectively: on Mondays, on Thursdays, on the last day of the maintenance period, on the last day of the
month and on the last day of June and December. MEETING is a dummy variable that takes value 1 on the day of
Governing Council meeting in which monetary policy stance is assessed. Q2(10) stands for Ljung-Box-Portmanteau statistic
for 10th order serial correlation of standardised squared residuals, and SIGN, POS and NEG stand, respectively, for the sign
bias, positive size bias and negative size bias tests proposed by Engle and Ng (1993), under the null they all are distributed
as a Student-t.
TABLE 5
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VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION FROM THE EONIA
coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error
ω0 -0.843 0.348 -0.668 0.313 -0.713 0.295
ω1 0.484 0.093 0.345 0.092 0.302 0.058
μ1 -0.098 0.091 -0.088 0.053 0.018 0.033
λ1 0.251 0.142 -0.021 0.074 0.151 0.102
λ2 0.195 0.164 0.337 0.053 0.411 0.089
λ3 0.385 0.083 0.525 0.081 0.350 0.086
MONDAYt -0.428 0.164
TUESDAYt -0.589 0.180
WEDNESDAYt 0.898 0.331
MPt -1.419 0.409 -1.708 0.357 -0.755 0.232
MEETINGt-1 1.892 0.436 1.689 0.361 1.051 0.257
MONTHt -1.532 0.305 0.649 0.203
log(σ1,t2)x(1-MROt) 0.162 0.045 0.153 0.044 0.004 0.015
log(σ1,t2)xMROtx(1-MPt+1-MPt) 0.291 0.051 0.289 0.049 0.005 0.027
log(σ1,t2)x(MPt+1+MPt) 0.093 0.127 0.019 0.152 -0.077 0.060
Q2(10)
SIGN
POS
NEG 0.432 0.805 1.010
0.176 -0.352 -1.821
-0.501 -0.041 0.260
1-MONTH EURIBOR 3-MONTH EURIBOR 12-MONTH EURIBOR
1.935 3.310 5.963
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. MONDAY, TUESDAY and WEDNESDAY, MP, MEETING, MONTH and MRO are
dummy variables that, respectively, take value 1 on: Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, the last day of the maintenance period,
the day of the Governing Council meeting in which monetary policy stance is assessed, the last day of the month and from the day
of the last main refinancing operation to the last day of the maintenance period. σ1,t2 is the conditional variance of the EONIA at
period t. Q2(10) stands for Ljung-Box-Portmanteau statistic for 10th order serial correlation of standardised squared residduals,
and SIGN, POS and NEG stand, respectively, for the sign bias, positive size bias and negative size bias tests proposed by Engle
and Ng (1993), under the null they all are distributed as a Student-t.
TABLE 6
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THE CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF THE OVERNIGHT RATE
coefficient standard error
ω0 -4.734 0.553
ω1 0.952 0.118
μ1 0.015 0.058
ω2 0.418 0.130
μ2 0.063 0.075
λ1 0.011 0.113
λ2 0.540 0.043
λ3 -0.148 0.067
FRIDAYt -0.532 0.192
(MPt+4+MPt+3+MPt+2)x(1-MROt) 0.877 0.322
(MPt+4+MPt+3+MPt+2)xMROt 1.876 0.361
MPt+1 2.334 0.296
MPt 2.286 0.467
MPt-1 1.521 0.318
MEETINGt-1 0.765 0.172
Q2(10) 9.208
SIGN -0.296
POS 0.002
NEG -0.393
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. FRIDAY, MP, MEETING and MRO are dummy variables that take value
1, respectively: on Fridays and on the last day of the maintenance period, on the day of Governing Council meeting in
which monetary policy stance is assessed, and from the day of the last main refinancing operation to the last day of
the maintenance period. Q2(10) stands for Ljung-Box-Portmanteau statistic for 10th order serial correlation of
standardised squared residuals, and SIGN, POS and NEG stand, respectively, for the sign bias, positive size bias and
negative size bias tests proposed by Engle and Ng (1993), under the null they all are distributed as a Student-t.
TABLE 7
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VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION FROM THE OVERNIGHT RATE
coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error
ω0 -1.101 0.403 -1.039 0.359 -1.749 0.704
ω1 0.505 0.095 0.501 0.089 0.254 0.075
μ1 -0.235 0.076 -0.098 0.067 0.097 0.050
ω2 0.544 0.103 0.052 0.151
μ2 0.051 0.052 -0.262 0.062
λ1 0.148 0.052 -0.177 0.136 0.249 0.107
λ2 0.077 0.057 0.539 0.070 0.083 0.123
λ3 0.620 0.045 0.475 0.100 0.387 0.102
MONDAYt -0.358 0.183
TUESDAYt -0.683 0.198
WEDNESDAYt 0.709 0.235
MPt -1.338 0.393 -1.378 0.516 -1.235 0.374
MEETINGt-1 1.668 0.336 1.411 0.380 1.048 0.297
log(σ1,t2)x(1-MROt-MPt-1) 0.195 0.092 0.138 0.062 0.026 0.034
log(σ1,t2)xMROtx(1-MPt+1-MPt) 0.282 0.112 0.284 0.063 0.078 0.049
log(σ1,t2)x(MPt+1+MPt) 0.198 0.203 0.015 0.171 -0.015 0.093
log(σ1,t2)xMPt-1 0.028 0.196 0.130 0.139 0.010 0.104
Q2(10)
SIGN
POS
NEG
1-MONTH EURIBOR 3-MONTH EURIBOR 12-MONTH EURIBOR
6.666 3.540 7.184
-0.032 0.082 0.175
0.395 0.210 -0.310
-0.638 -0.065 -0.378
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. MONDAY, TUESDAY, WEDNESDAY, MP, MEETING and MRO are dummy
variables that, respectively, take value 1 on: Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, the last day of the maintenance period, the day
of the Governing Council meeting in which monetary policy stance is assessed, and from the day of the last main refinancing
operation to the last day of the maintenance period. σ1,t2 is the conditional variance of the overnight rate at period t. Q2(10)
stands for Ljung-Box-Portmanteau statistic for 10th order serial correlation of standardised squared residduals, and SIGN, POS
and NEG stand, respectively, for the sign bias, positive size bias and negative size bias tests proposed by Engle and Ng (1993),
under the null they all are distributed as a Student-t.
TABLE 8
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THE CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY OF THE EONIA. MEAN MODEL ESTIMATED BY
SUBPERIODS
coefficient standard error
ω0 -2.512 0.162
ω1 0.997 0.078
μ1 0.203 0.066
ω2 -0.819 0.092
μ2 -0.239 0.078
ω3 0.734 0.072
μ3 0.228 0.062
λ1 1.361 0.055
λ2 -1.109 0.083
λ3 0.484 0.047
THURSDAYt -0.380 0.119
MPt+4+MPt+3+MPt+2 1.031 0.130
MPt+1 2.067 0.168
MPt 2.036 0.255
HALFYEARt 2.437 0.577
HALFYEARt-1 -2.171 0.394
MEETINGt 0.586 0.205
Q2(10) 4.714
SIGN 0.269
POS -0.701
NEG 0.396
The sample is split in two periods (4/1/1999 to 7/11/2001 and 8/11/2001 to 6/11/2003) and a different mean model is
estimated for each subperiod. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. THURSDAY, MP AND HALFYEAR are stational
dummy variables that take value 1, respectively: on Thursdays, on the last day of the maintenance period, on the last day of
the month and on the last day of June and December. MEETING is a dummy variable that takes value 1 on the day of
Governing Council meeting in which monetary policy stance is assessed. Q2(10) stands for Ljung-Box-Portmanteau statistic
for 10th order serial correlation of standardised squared residuals, and SIGN, POS and NEG stand, respectively, for the sign
bias, positive size bias and negative size bias tests proposed by Engle and Ng (1993), under the null they all are distributed
as a Student-t.
TABLE 9
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VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION FROM THE EONIA. MEAN MODEL ESTIMATED BY
SUBPERIODS
coefficient st. error coefficient st. error coefficient st. error
ω0 -1.006 0.349 -0.558 0.280 -0.611 0.287
ω1 0.561 0.092 0.434 0.073 0.275 0.057
μ1 -0.041 0.076 -0.042 0.050 0.035 0.035
λ1 0.294 0.128 -0.020 0.081 0.131 0.103
λ2 0.263 0.090 0.408 0.070 0.388 0.096
λ3 0.292 0.082 0.500 0.084 0.403 0.095
MONDAYt -0.424 0.171
TUESDAYt -0.590 0.180
WEDNESDAYt 1.105 0.306
MPt -1.142 0.398 -1.679 0.352 -0.820 0.236
MEETINGt-1 1.702 0.407 1.524 0.312 0.959 0.254
MONTHt -1.519 0.289 0.374 0.221
log(σ1,t2)x(1-MROt) 0.126 0.062 0.121 0.050 0.002 0.015
log(σ1,t2)xMROtx(1-MPt+1-MPt) 0.266 0.068 0.221 0.062 0.001 0.027
log(σ1,t2)x(MPt+1+MPt) 0.098 0.133 -0.061 0.153 -0.075 0.063
Q2(10)
SIGN
POS
NEG
1-MONTH EURIBOR 3-MONTH EURIBOR 12-MONTH EURIBOR
1.920 3.193 6.130
0.280 0.475 0.850
0.169 0.255 -0.758
-0.306 -0.243 -0.415
The sample is split in two periods (4/1/1999 to 7/11/2001 and 8/11/2001 to 6/11/2003) and a different mean model is estimated
for each subperiod. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. MONDAY, TUESDAY and WEDNESDAY, MP, MEETING,
MONTH and MRO are dummy variables that, respectively, take value 1 on: Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, the last day of the
maintenance period, the day of the Governing Council meeting in which monetary policy stance is assessed, the last day of the
month and from the day of the last main refinancing operation to the last day of the maintenance period. σ1,t2 is the conditional
variance of the EONIA at period t. Q2(10) stands for Ljung-Box-Portmanteau statistic for 10th order serial correlation of
standardised squared residduals, and SIGN, POS and NEG stand, respectively, for the sign bias, positive size bias and negative
size bias tests proposed by Engle and Ng (1993), under the null they all are distributed as a Student-t.
TABLE 10
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1
2
3
4
5
6
Jan-99 Jul-99 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
EONIA
MAIN REFINANCING OPERATION RATE
%
1
2
3
4
5
6
Jan-99 Jul-99 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03
1
2
3
4
5
6
1-MONTH EURIBOR
3-MONTH EURIBOR
1-YEAR EURIBOR
% %
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0541 
 
CONDITIONAL STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE EONIA CHART 2
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MEANS OF CONDITIONAL STANDARD DEVIATION FOR MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATES
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